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UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF JUDICIAL DIVERSITY
THROUGH THE NATIVE AMERICAN LENS
Paige E. Hoster*
Although Indians constitute less than 1% of the national
population, the lives of Indians are impacted by law more
pervasively than are the lives of most other Americans.'
I. Introduction
Diversity is the United States' defining characteristic. As the "melting
pot,"2 this country continues to pursue diversity through policies like
affirmative action.3  Universities seek a diverse student body to attain a
"robust exchange of ideas."4  Corporations hire and retain a diverse
workforce to increase their client bases and to stimulate innovation through
diversity of thought.5 But America's preoccupation with diversity does not
* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. I would like to thank
my family (Kirk, Daria, and Erin) for their constant, loving support of my academic
endeavors. I would also like to thank Dana Good for allowing me to test the ideas of this
comment with him and for guiding the inspiration of my topic. Finally, I have deep
appreciation for the editorial input of both Professor Mary Sue Backus and Crystal D.
Masterson. These women have helped me to become a better writer and were integral to the
success of this comment.
1. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REv. 267, 296 (2001).
2. See generally ISRAEL ZANGWILL, FROM THE GHETTO TO THE MELTING POT: ISRAEL
ZANGWILL'S JEWISH PLAYS (Edna Nahshon ed., 2005).
3. See generally Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral
Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REv. 1063 (2006) (suggesting that the
Affirmative Action conversation be re-framed with scientific findings of implicit bias in
mind).
4. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). The Supreme Court recognizes
that student body diversity is a compelling state interest. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003). In practical terms, this means that the Court considers racial variety an essential
component to a student's higher education.
5. See Leslie Kwoh, Firms Hail New Chiefs (of Diversity), WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203899504577129261732884578.html?KE
YWORDS=Diverse+CEO. In fact, minorities are responsible for launching over half of the
technology groups in Silicon Valley, for creating more than a quarter of the nation's global
patents, and for comprising nearly a quarter of our science and engineering sector. Richard
Florida, The Melting Pot That Isn't: Why America Needs Better Immigration, ATLANTIC
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mean that there is complete agreement regarding its value or how to achieve
it.6 This comment focuses on the value of diversity within the judicial
context. It asserts that judicial diversity (and the lack thereof) matters,
especially when Native American law is involved.
This comment examines the significance of judicial diversity within the
Native American context. Native Americans have been, and currently are,
severely underrepresented on the federal bench. Moreover, when federal
courts make decisions regarding tribal interests, the outcomes historically
favor the non-tribal position.7 Federal decision making's dramatic impact
on Indian law, coupled with diversity's symbolic and empirically supported
benefits,8 suggest that Native American federal judges are necessary to
yield fair outcomes regarding tribal issues. But Congress inexplicably
thwarted the most recent effort to appoint a qualified Native American to
the federal bench, inspiring the topic of this comment.
Part II of this comment discusses the two-fold role of judicial diversity.
Diversity on a judicial panel not only influences societal perceptions of
justice and fairness, but also influences substantive decision making, with a
marked correlation between diversity on a given judicial panel and the
respective case outcomes. Research suggests that this correlation stems
from minority judges' ability to empathize with minority interests.
Drawing on related observations about empathy, Part III summarizes the
aspects of Indian law and federal Indian relations that make judicial
empathy even more compelling in the tribal context. It first explores the
history of federal Indian law, noting how the differences between tribal and
non-tribal interests are complex, multi-faceted, and affect various aspects of
tribal life. It then examines Professor Matthew Fletcher's study of tribal-
interest certiorari petitions. Fletcher's study finds that the United States
Supreme Court is not only less likely to grant certiorari when a case
implicates tribal interests, but the Court is also less likely to find in favor of
tribal interests when certiorari is indeed granted.9
(Apr. 19, 2011, 9:30 AM ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/04/the-
melting-pot-that-isnt-why-america-needs-better-immigration/72048/.
6. In fact, many critics of diversity believe that forcing diversity is arbitrary, uncalled
for, and even unconstitutional. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316-17 (discussing petitioner's
argument that race-conscious admission programs violate Equal Protection rights).
7. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier
to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARiz. L. REV. 933, 935 (2009) [hereinafter Fletcher,
Factbound and Splitless].
8. See infra Part II.




Collectively, Parts II and III establish that judicial diversity and the
empathy that accompanies it have tangible value, that tribal interests differ
markedly and meaningfully from those of their non-tribal counterparts, and
that the Supreme Court historically disregards and disfavors tribal interests.
With these points in mind, Part IV first reviews the recent attempt to
nominate a Native American to the federal judiciary and then considers the
various benefits that could flow from a successful nomination. As this
comment will demonstrate, Native American presence on the federal
judiciary would increase public confidence in the justice system, enhance
substantive decision making, and place tribal litigants in front of judges
familiar with their unique circumstances.
This comment concludes in Part V.
II. The Role ofDiversity in the Courts
Diversity on the judicial bench has long been valued. Scholars argue that
diversity helps to achieve "judicial impartiality," 0 "dispel traditional
stereotypes,"" "enhance[] the quality of judicial decision making,"' 2
promote a sense of fairness to the public,' 3 "enrich[] development of the
law,"14 and sharpen the deliberation process. All of these benefits can be
distilled into two key ideas: (1) judicial diversity enhances public
confidence in the judicial system; and (2) judicial diversity enhances
substantive decision making.
A. Social Perception
Scholars recognize judicial diversity's impact on public perception.
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy asserts that judicial diversity adds a sense of
"legitimacy" in the minds of the public because both the constituents in
court and the public at large are becoming increasingly diverse.' 6  She
10. Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American
Courts, 10 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 153, 156 (2004) (quoting Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity
on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405,
449-58 (2000)).
11. Id. (quoting Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CAL.
L. REV. 1109, 1117-20 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id.
14. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, A Bench That Looks Like America: Diversity Among
Appointed State Court Judges, JUDGES' J., Summer 2009, at 12, 14.
15. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost ofPartisan Politics on Minority
Diversity on the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1424 (2008).
16. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 14, at 13.
No. 2]1 459
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references Professor Jeffrey Jackson's discussion of the need for the bench
to reflect a cross section of the community:
Judges are not the exclusive province of any one section of
society. Rather they must provide justice for all. In order for a
judicial selection to be considered fair and impartial, it must be
seen as representative of the community. It is important for a
selection system insofar as it is possible, to advance methods that
provide for a judicial bench that reflects the diversity of its
qualified applicants. 7
The closer the bench resembles the American people, the more the public
trusts the bench is free from bias and prejudice. When the bench's racial
composition does not resemble that of the greater American society, "both
public support of the courts and Nerceptions of fairness on the part of racial
and ethnic groups are affected."
In addition to discussing the impact of judicial diversity generally,
Professor Barbara Graham also exposes the need for the judicial bench to
"move beyond tokenism" into actual representation.20 In the context of the
judiciary, tokenism is the practice of making a perfunctory or symbolic
effort to increase diversity on the bench.21 Tokenism results in limited
recruitment of people from underrepresented groups to give the appearance
of equality, while in actuality minorities remain underrepresented. Having
actual, representative diversity means obtaining a proportion of minority
judges commensurate to that minority's population within the community.
Tokenism, though a marginal improvement from outright absence, falls far
short of representative diversity.
17. Id. (quoting Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial
Selection and Their Application to a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 125, 145 (2007)).
18. Professor Barbara Graham also recognizes the general public's increased confidence
when the representation on courts is diverse. Graham, supra note 10, at 156. She maintains
that "[a] diverse judiciary signals the public acknowledgement of historically excluded
communities and sends an invaluable message of inclusion." Id. (quoting Chen, supra note
11, at 1117-20) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, Professor Sylvia Lazos
Vargas argues that "as a democratic institution, [the judiciary] should be derived from and
representative of 'we the people."' Vargas, supra note 15, at 1427.
19. Graham, supra note 10, at 156.
20. Id.
21. See Tokenism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com (last




A recent study of the factors that influence selection of judicial
candidates highlighted tokenism as a barrier to incorporating minorities.
The study showed that selections of minority judges to courts are much less
likely to occur when the given minority is already represented, even when
that representation is marginal.22 For example, within the specific context
of gender diversity, "women are much more likely to be selected to
otherwise all-male courts than to courts with some gender diversity," even
if that diversity consists of only one female. 23
Tokenism amounts to an incomplete step in the right direction. The
value of having at least one minority on a federal panel is significant and
should not be discounted. Even minimal diversity can alter outcomes in
certain cases.24 Tokenism is harmful, however, when it prevails over long-
term goals of full diversity. When diversity ends at tokenism, the
institution will not reflect a cross section of the community and will
therefore fail to achieve true representative diversity.
The general public may not be consciously aware of the limiting effects
that tokenism has on establishing actual representative diversity - or even
what tokenism is and how to recognize it. But the public will recognize
that the federal bench does not resemble their communities, and this
awareness will hurt the public's perception of the federal bench.
Because scholars suggest that public confidence is diminished whenever
the judicial bench's demographic composition does not mirror the public at
large,25 appearing before an entirely white, Judeo-Christian, male bench
likely engenders discomfort for parties who are female or a minority. Even
without considering the notable substantive benefits that flow from
minority representation on a federal panel, the symbolic benefits of judicial
diversity are similarly significant and worthy of pursuit.
B. Enhanced Judicial Decision Making
Not only does judicial diversity give the general public a greater sense of
confidence in the judicial process, but it also enhances the judicial process
itself.26 The presence of individuals with varied backgrounds improves
judicial decision making because "member[s] of [] previously excluded
group[s] can bring insights to the Court that the rest of its members lack." 27
22. See Rorie L. Spill Solberg & Kathleen A. Bratton, Diversifying the Federal Bench:
Presidential Patterns, 26 JusT. Sys. J. 119, 123 (2005).
23. Id.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. Graham, supra note 10, at 156.
26. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 14, at 13.
27. Id. (citation omitted).
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These unique insights are a product of varied social experiences that stem
from cultural diversity. A judge's cumulative social experiences affect the
way the judge construes testimony and comprehends the full weight of the
court's ruling.28 Essentially, a judge's cultural outlook supplies a human
factor to the decision-making process, as it is inevitable that one's own life
experiences affect one's view on the facts of a case or aspects of the law. 29
Many scholars believe that factors such as race, ethnicity, culture, and
life experiences affect the way people make decisions in their daily lives.30
Such a view stands in stark contrast to legal formalism, the dominant strand
of philosophy regarding decision making in the judicial context. Legal
formalism posits that judges are capable of remaining color blind, applying
the law in a neutral and dispassionate manner.31 In fact, "the judicial code
of ethics dictates impartiality," as judges must "independently derive 'what
the law is"' from the Constitution and fundamental precedents alone.32 The
code of ethics presumes that no matter the facts, judges can apply the law in
a purely mechanical way.
On the other hand, advocates of legal realism argue that who people are
affects how they judge. 33 More scholars are beginning to recognize that
28. Graham, supra note 10, at 156.
2 9. Id.
30. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107
(2010).
31. In his book, The Federal Courts, Richard Posner discusses the legal tradition known
as "formalism." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 307
(2d prtg. 1996). Formalism "is the idea that the judge has no will, makes no value choices,
but is just a kind of calculating machine." Id. The proponents of formalism see a difference
between the role of the "passive transmitter[]" of the law and the role of "creators" of the
law. Id. at 308. Under a formalistic approach, the judge uses "logical deduction" and
receives "principles of the law from his predecessors, from custom, from judges of higher
courts .. . and from the Constitution . . . ." Id.
32. Vargas, supra note 15, at 1426.
33. Legal realists have vastly different views regarding jurisprudence when compared to
formalists. One prominent realist, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote the famous
line, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." Id. at 305 (quoting
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)); see also id. (quoting HOLMES,
supra, at 1) ("The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed."). Several modem authors agree with Holmes,
arguing that formalism is actually "a myth" supported by a false notion that decision making
must and can be done objectively. See generally Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of




judges are human and that a judge's ability to make purely mechanical
decisions might be "largely theoretical." 34 There is nonetheless a current
lack of consensus, and the battle between legal formalism and realism may
affect whether a judicial candidate is nominated based on his or her
minority status. This comment, in its assertion that minority status both
affects and enhances substantive judicial decision making, reflects a legal
realist perspective.
Empathy is central to understanding legal realism in the context of the
judicial process. 35  Empathy is not the equivalent of sympathy. While
sympathy is "an emotional response stemming from another's emotional
state or condition that is not identical to the other's emotion, but consists of
feelings of sorrow and concern for another," empathy is "an affective state
that stems from the apprehension of another's emotional state or condition
and that is congruent with it."36 In relative terms, sympathy is to empathy
what knowledge is to appreciation. Empathy involves a deep appreciation
of another's circumstance through shared human experience.
REV. 1117 (2009). Professor Barbara Graham quotes Harry Stumpf's discussion on the
"1great paradox of the judicial role":
Courts and other things legal continue to be important symbols of government, under girding
the wish-fulfilling notions we have of impartial decision-making. At the same time, one can
hardly deny that courts are political, for in construing statutes, executive orders, or
constitutions, they inevitably weigh competing arguments, interests, and philosophies in
arriving at decisions that cannot be neutral.
Graham, supra note 10, at 160 (quoting HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS
187 (2d ed. 1998)).
34. Chew & Kelley, supra note 33, at 1131 (citation omitted).
35. Prior to his presidential election, Barack Obama stated that he would nominate
judges who have the "empathy to understand what it's like to be poor, or African American,
or gay, or disabled, or old." Ilya Somin & Erwin Chemerinsky, Is There a Conflict Between
Empathy and Good Judging?, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/
news/opinion/opinionla/la-oew-chemerinsky-somin28-2009may28,0,4921073.story. This
statement led to an argument about whether empathy is a legitimate basis for judicial rulings.
While the formalist argues that empathy should not factor into judicial decision making
because it clouds logical deduction with emotion-based considerations, the realist counters
that judging has never been a calculated process, and that it has always been a highly
discretionary and human-based activity. Moreover, interpreting legal rules that were
implemented as a result of social norms requires the use of a judge's values, not "any
objective methodology." Id.
36. Nancy Eisenberg & Paul Miller, Empathy, Sympathy, and Altruism: Empirical and
Conceptual Links, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 292 (Nancy Eisenberg & Janet
Strayer eds., 1987).
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Scholars maintain that empathy promotes better judicial outcomes.37
Judicial diversity places judges on the bench who, through empathy, can
readily appreciate the experiences of a broader spectrum of litigants. This
appreciation allows judges to understand individual actions and the
motivations behind them, making the judges better able to assess whether
such actions are legally or equitably justified. For example, a judge whose
parents emigrated from a politically volatile region shortly before her birth
will undoubtedly be better able to appreciate the experiences of those
seeking asylum from persecution. Through empathy, this judge will be
more capable of assessing the fairness and justice that accompany each
potential outcome.3 8
Just as there is empirical evidence suggesting that judicial diversity
enhances the public's perception of the justice system, so too are there
empirical studies examining the impacts of diversity and empathy in
judicial decision making. Researchers are beginning to test legal
formalists' claim that judges can remain neutral, dispassionate, and color
blind in decision making. To examine this claim, scholars are studying how
judges make decisions and whether minority status has any impact on
judicial outcomes.
In his article on cultural cognition, Professor Paul Secunda discusses the
impact of culture on judicial functions. 39 He comments that culture and
ideology generally are not active motivators when making judicial
decisions, but that a udge "cannot help but be influenced by his or her
cultural background." Although a judge's values, ideologies, and cultural
biases are not conscious motivators, Secunda asserts that they nevertheless
contribute greatly to how a judge arrives at a legal conclusion.41
Secunda defines "cultural cognition" as the Jrocess by which culture
influences the subconscious thought process. Whether noticed, life
experiences and cultural outlooks have an effect on the decision-making
process. Secunda draws a distinction between using culture "as a source of
normative judgment or evaluation" and as "an unconscious influence of
perceptions of fact."43 For example, Secunda references a study examining
37. See infra notes 38-69 and accompanying text.
38. While some skeptics may counter with the argument that empathy engenders bias,
that same line of reasoning would suggest an overall judicial bias in favor of white, upper-
class males.
39. See generally Secunda, supra note 30.
40. Id. at 108.
4 1. Id.





the Supreme Court's decision in a police brutality case.44 The study found
that ideology was the dividing factor between justices supporting the
majority and dissenting opinions.45 To be specific, the justices siding with
the dissent shared a common ideology of "egalitarianism and social
solidarity," and would most likely be classified as liberal. 6 Alternatively,
those supporting the majority opinion shared an ideology of individualism
and "hierarchic worldviews," approving of "highly punitive responses to
law-breaking." 47 Essentially, the study found that a judge's ideological
slant determines how that judge responds to a given set of facts within the
parameters of law.
Secunda's article recognizes the subconscious (and likely unintended)
effects that one's cultural background can have on the decision-making
process. Although judicial ideology and cultural cognition are difficult to
measure with precision, the theory Secunda proposes is logical: because
cultural cogition is linked to a person's perceptions of "socially beneficial
conduct,"4 life experience influences what that person perceives to be
socially beneficial. And more directly apropos to the scope of this
comment, judges often decide what qualifies as socially beneficial conduct.
Those decisions will undoubtedly incorporate life experience, even if
subconsciously. A judge's life experience includes not only the
communities in which the judge was raised and the judge's socio-economic
status, but also race, ethnicity, gender, and customs. From Secunda's work,
one can draw the reasonable inference that diversity has a subconscious
effect on judicial decision making.
In a similar study, Professor Pat Chew examines gender diversity's effect
on judicial decision making. 49  Chew's article recognizes the symbolic
value of having increased female presence on the bench.50 But her article
goes beyond diversity's symbolic value to evaluate the actual, substantive
effects that increased female presence in the judiciary has on judicial
outcomes. 51 Chew's study "offers a macro-level review of the empirical
research done on judges' gender in U.S. federal courts and how a judge's
44. Id. at 118-21.
45. Id. at 120-21.
46. Id. at 120.
47. Id. (quoting Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REv. 837, 863 (2009)).
48. Id. at 112.
49. See generally Pat K. Chew, Judges'Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases:
Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUsT. 359 (2011).
50. Id. at 360.
5 1. Id.
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gender affects the outcomes in employment discrimination cases" and in
sexual harassment cases.52 Although focused on particular areas of law,
Chew's study tests Secunda's theory that culture, including gender,
influences judicial outcomes.
While balancing other factors such as court venue, time period, legal
subject area, and the judge's other characteristics, Chew notes a correlation
between a judge's gender and legal outcomes. 53 For example, in sexual
discrimination cases, female judges are more likely than male judges to rule
in favor of the plaintiffs.54  The same holds true for sexual harassment
cases.5 5  And not only are female judges more likely to rule in favor of
plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases than their male counterparts, but male
judges are more likely to "rule in favor of the plaintiff if at least one female
judge sat on the appellate panel."56 In sexual discrimination cases, when a
judicial R anel is all male, it is extremely unlikely that the plaintiff will
prevail. On the other hand, when at least one female judge sits on the
panel, the likelihood of a plaintiff victory may increase by as much as
85%. 58 These findings suggest that gender may influence both the
decision-making process of the female judge, as well as the deliberation
process of the male judge, when at least one female joins them on the same
panel. The study therefore supports the conclusion that in certain types of
52. Id. at 361.
53. See id. at 362-66.
54. Id. at 366 (citing Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling
the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging 2 (2009) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Journal
of Gender, Race & Justice)).
55. Id. (citing Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial
Decision Making on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with the Journal of Gender, Race &
Justice); Tajuana Massie et al., The Impact of Gender and Race in the Decisions of Judges
on the United States Courts of Appeals (Apr. 25-28, 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Journal of Gender, Race & Justice); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges
Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE
L.J. 1759 (2005)). Another study, however, found that gender made no difference in judicial
decision making. Id. (citing Carol T. Kulik et al., Here Comes the Judge: The Influence of
Judge Personal Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment Case Outcomes, 27 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 69 (2003)). Because of the reliable research methodologies it employed,
Chew's article focuses on a particular sexual discrimination study that found a correlation
between female judges and plaintiff victories. Id. at 367.






cases, having a mixed-gender panel of judges has a measurable effect on
the outcome for litigants.5 9
In the context of these findings, it is particularly noteworthy that both
sexual discrimination and sexual harassment cases are historically and
notoriously female-centric, supporting the idea that empathy goes hand-in-
hand with judicial diversity and its substantive impact on decision making.
But the effects of female judicial presence are not limited to cases that
concern characteristically female interests. 60  Similar studies have been
conducted within the broader context of employment discrimination. One
study, analyzing "400 federal appellate court employment discrimination
cases from 1998-1999," found that a panel including at least one female
judge voted pro-plaintiff more often than all-male panels.62 The findings
suggest that the presence of both genders affects the deliberation process, as
varying perspectives are exchanged.63 The simple presence of one minority
judge's viewpoint shifts the ruling of the entire panel.
Overall, Chew concludes that the presence of mixed gender on the
federal bench has the greatest impact within the sexual discrimination field
and a slightZ lessened impact within the field of employment
discrimination. This conclusion supports Secunda's theory on cultural
cognition. Because the fact patterns within sexual harassment and
discrimination cases often involve gender-based issues, female judges will
perceive the facts in a way that comports with their cultural (or gender)
outlook and empathize accordingly. The cultural cognition theory supports
Chew's empirical finding that female judges hold in favor of sexual-
harassment and discrimination plaintiffs more often than male judges, as
well as her finding that female judges can induce a mixed-gender panel into
pro-plaintiff findings in these types of cases.
59. See id.
60. Although employment discrimination cases may often concern gender-based
discrimination, they also often relate to race, ethnicity, religion, or some other minority-
based factor. It is therefore fair to state that while sexual harassment and sexual
discrimination cases characteristically concern gender-based claims, employment
discrimination cases only sometimes center on gender.
61. While some studies found similar correlations between gender and pro-plaintiff
outcomes, other studies found no correlation between these factors. Id. at 367-68.
62. Id. at 368 (citing Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the
U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 299, 301 (2004)).
63. Id. at 369.
64. Id. at 371.
No. 2] 467
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Along with studies examining the impact of judges' gender in gender-
based -cases, several studies also examine the impact of a judge's race in
race-based cases. Chew's article canvasses a twenty-year study
investigating the outcomes of racial harassment cases by comparing the
rulings of African American judges to Caucasian judges.65 The study found
that where African American judges preside over cases involving racial
discrimination, the "plaintiffs had the highest success rate."6 6 But when the
judges are all Caucasian, plaintiffs have lower success rates than that of the
baseline average outcome for these types of cases, which is already low. 67
The study also examines the specific nature of racial harassment claims.
When the case concerns explicit forms of racial harassment, such as the use
of racial slurs, plaintiffs are even more successful in front of African
American judges, having a "60% success rate."68 When racial slur cases
come before Caucasian judges, however, the plaintiffs' success rate drops
to "only 27.6%." 69 The study concludes that the judge's race does have an
impact on the outcomes of racial harassment cases generally, but the impact
is amplified when the racial quality of the harassment complained of is
particularly egregious. 70
Like the gender-based studies, this race-based study supports Secunda's
cultural cognition theory. When cases involve heightened degrees of race-
based considerations, the race of the presiding judge has an effect on the
outcome. And the more blatant the claim's racial quality, the starker the
correlation. The egregiousness of the claim's racial nature widens the
success-rate gap for litigants depending on whether the presiding judge is
African American or Caucasian. These specific findings support the
general notion that when the judge's minority status (race or gender)
matches the minority-centered issue (racial or sexual harassment), the
substantive outcome is affected.
65. See generally Chew & Kelley, supra note 33. The authors of the study admit that
they cannot predict judicial outcomes based on the judge's race. Id. at 1117. They do
conclude, however, that African American and Caucasian judges "perceive racial
harassment" cases differently. Id. The cases discussed in this study predominantly feature
Caucasian judges presiding over cases involving African American plaintiffs complaining of
racial employment discrimination by their Caucasian superiors or fellow employees. Id. at
1135-36.
66. Id. at 1141.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1150.
69. Id.




Collectively, the aforementioned studies establish a meaningful
correlation between minority status and judicial decision making. Judicial
empathy impacts not only the minority judge, but also the perspective of
fellow judges. Bringing an empathetic perspective to the courtroom both
impacts and enhances substantive decision making.
III. The Unique Circumstance ofNative American Litigants
Nowhere is empathy more needed - or more lacking - than in
decisions involving Native American parties. Native Americans, and the
cultural empathy they could bring, are conspicuously lacking on both the
state and federal bench. Though Native Americans comprise 1% of the
general population, they make up only 0.1% of state court judges. There
are currently no Native American federal judges. 7  In fact, in all of United
States history, only two Native Americans have served on the federal
judiciary.72 The two Native Americans to ever hold federal judgeships did
so only at the district court level in the state of Oklahoma.73 This means
that a Native American has never served as a judge at the appellate level,
nor on the United States Supreme Court, and that forty-nine states have had
no Native American representation in the federal judiciary.
But the greater problem lies not in the numbers themselves; it lies in
what those numbers mean on a practical level. As highlighted in the
previous section, judicial diversity enhances substantive decision making
by placing litigants before empathetic judges. While such findings suggest
that judges generally have difficulty appreciating the motivations of
litigants with characteristics that differ from their own, the divide would
undoubtedly be far greater for Native American parties. The reason for this
greater divide stems primarily from the unique legal relationship between
the federal government and the Indian tribes and flows to other aspects of
tribal life. Although a full discussion of the myriad ways in which Native
American legal issues differ from those of their non-Native counterparts is
outside the scope of this comment, a high-level overview is necessary to
appreciate the context-specific need for increased Native American judicial
diversity and the attendant empathy it creates. After reviewing the complex
71. Id. at 1122-24, 1126.
72. Andrew Cohen, The Mikkanen Nomination and the White Man, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6,
2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/02/the-mikkanen-nomi
nation-and-the-white-man/70752/ [hereinafter Cohen, Mikkanen Nomination]. This
underrepresentation is not limited to the judiciary. In 2002, only "0.2% of lawyers were
Native American." Chew & Kelley, supra note 33, at 1127.
73. Cohen, Mikkanen Nomination, supra note 72.
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web of legal rules that are so prohibitively convoluted as to impede judicial
sympathy (let alone empathy), this section then examines Professor
Matthew Fletcher's findings that the certiorari process inherently disfavors
tribal interests.
A. A Primer in Indian Law and Tribal Life
1. The Beginnings
Federal Indian law finds its roots in three seminal cases known as the
Marshall Trilogy, which establish the foundational underpinnings of federal
Indian relations.74  The first of these cases, Johnson v. M'Intosh,75
established that discovery76 gave the federal government title to all lands
within its borders, "subject only to the Indian right of occupancy." 77 In
other words, although the Indians have the right to occupy tribal lands, they
enjoy this right at the sufferance of the federal government, which holds the
underlying fee title.78
The second case in the Marshall Trilogy is Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia.79 In this case, Chief Justice John Marshall was called upon to
define the status of tribes within the greater political structure. Relying on
the express distinction in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution
that distinguishes "foreign nations" and the "several states" from "Indian
tribes," Marshall held that tribes were neither foreign states nor "one of the
several states composing the union." 80  This finding forced Marshall to
74. Jen Camden & Kathryn E. Fort, "Channeling Thought": The Legacy of Legal
Fictions from 1823, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77, 86 (2008-2009).
75. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
76. The discovery doctrine "provided that newly arrived Europeans immediately and
automatically acquired legally recognized property rights in native lands and also gained
governmental, political, and commercial rights over the inhabitants without the knowledge
or the consent of the Indigenous peoples." ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING
INDIGENOUs LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 2 (2010).
77. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585.
78. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land
Consolidation Act, 85 IOwA L. REV. 595, 602-03 (2000) ("The 1823 decision of Johnson v.
MIntosh constructed the current foundation for federal Indian land policy by swiftly
sweeping Indian land 'ownership' into the oddly-hybrid form it retains today: tribal use at
federal sufferance. Johnson involved claims of colonial speculators to enormous land
parcels through purchase from two tribes. Denying their claim in favor of purchasers from
the federal government, Johnson held that, via the British Crown, discovery conferred fee
title, and, thus, transferability, upon the United States, subject only to tribal rights of use and
occupancy which were extinguishable by federal conquest or purchase.").
79. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).




fashion "a new form of sovereign - neither domestic state nor foreign
nation - but instead a domestic dependent nation, whose relationship to
the United States was akin to that of a ward to its guardian."8 1 Marshall's
characterization of tribes as "domestic dependent nations"82 spawned the
trust doctrine, which forms the basis of federal Indian relations.83 Under
the trust doctrine, Congress "acquired not only power over affairs 'with' but
also 'of Indians." 84  As guardians of the Indian wards, the federal
government is charged with protecting the Indians and their rights.85
The final case in the Marshall Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia,86 was
decided just one year after Cherokee Nation. In Worcester, Marshall held
that "Congress had 'plenary' power over Indian affairs." He wrote that
"[t]he whole intercourse between the United States and [the tribes], is, by
our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."88
Because of Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs, Marshall held
81. Taiawagi Helton, Introduction to the IACHR Report on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples' Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 257,
257-58 n.4 (2010-2011).
82. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
83. George Jackson III, Chickasaw Nation v. United States and the Potential Demise of
the Indian Canon of Construction, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 399, 402-03 (2002-2003)
("Marshall wrote that the Indian Nations may be more correctly 'denominated as domestic
dependent nations,' with their relationship to the United States resembling 'that of a ward to
his guardian.' These words, now the touchstone of Federal Indian law, established the trust
relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes that remains to this day.").
84. Helton, supra note 81, at 257 n.3.
85. Benjamin W. Thompson, The De Facto Termination of Alaska Native Sovereignty:
An Anomaly in an Era of Self-Determination, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 421, 424 (1999-2000)
("Critical to an understanding of the context of tribal sovereignty and the impetus behind the
various past federal Indian policies is an awareness of the nature of the relationship of
Native Americans to the federal government. The relationship is known as a trust
relationship, with Congress as trustee, Native Americans as the beneficiaries, and Native
Americans' real property and natural resources as the corpus, whereby the federal
government owes a fiduciary duty or obligation to Native Americans. One commentator
defined the trusteeship as 'the legal and moral duty of the United States to assist Indians in
the protection of their property and rights."') (quoting GILBERT L. HALL, THE FEDERAL-
INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 3 (1979)).
86. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
87. William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Pleafor Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
1, 33-34 (2002-2003).
88. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
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that state laws cannot reach the tribal lands that fall within their boundaries,
nor the Indians that occupy them.89
Collectively, these three cases establish that Indians hold property
differently from other American citizens, that their relationship with the
federal government differs from that of other American citizens, and that
their relationship with states differs from that of other American citizens.
With such marked distinctions in the most basic aspects of their existence,
one can appreciate how it is both more difficult and more important for
judges charged with determining tribal litigants' rights and responsibilities
to understand the circumstances of Native Americans.
2. Shifting Federal Policies
Adding to the already labyrinthine "basics" of Indian law, federal policy
regarding Indians has constantly shifted over the centuries,90 leading to era-
dependent goals and rules. The first policy era was one of isolation and
separation, lasting "[t]hroughout the colonial era, and continuing after the
ratification of the United States Constitution."91 This era of "peacekeeping
through separation",92 ended with the federal government's proposed
"solution to the Indian problem."93 Rather than accommodate the Indians'
unique customs within the broader social order, the government adopted an
assimilationist policy: "to introduce among the Indians the customs and
pursuits of civilized life and gradually to absorb them into the mass of our
citizens." 94  The General Allotment Act95 of 1887 provided the means
89. Id. ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.").
90. Darla J. Mondou, Our Land Is What Makes Us Who We Are: Timber Harvesting on
Tribal Reservations After the NIFRMA, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 259, 262-63 (1997).
91. John D. Barton & Candace M. Barton, Jurisdiction of Ute Reservation Lands, 26
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 133, 133 (2001-2002).
92. Jered T. Davidson, Comment, This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land? Why
the Cobell Settlement Will Not Resolve Indian Land Fractionation, 35 AM INDIAN L. REv.
575, 580 (2010-2011).
93. Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of Territoriality
and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust through 25 C.F.R. Part
15, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 421, 447 (2002-2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 288 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (2006)). The General Allotment Act is also known as
the Dawes Act. Suzianne D. Painter-Thome, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back:




through which the federal government would advance its assimilative
goals.9 6  By allotting tribal lands to individual Indians, the Act was
designed such that the Indians would "become agrarian, Christians, and
citizens." 97  The federal government's other, more sinister goals with
respect to assimilation included "breaking up tribal ownership of land,
opening the reservations for settlement, and destroying tribal existence."98
As a federal policy, allotment not only failed to achieve its stated goals,99
but also had devastating consequences for tribes and their members, 00
American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329,
348 (2008-2009).
96. John Fredericks III, Indian Lands: Financing Indian Culture: Mortgaged Indian
Lands and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 105, 105 (1989);
Guzman, supra note 78, at 597 ("In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act to
privatize Indian reservations and advance the assimilationist sentiment of the day. The Act
divested land from tribes to their members, each of whom received a tract of land on a wing
and a prayer: become an autonomous Christian agrarian."); Painter-Thome, supra note 95, at
349 ("It was hoped that allotment would solve the problems of the Indians in one generation,
as the effect of ownership of private property would impel the native person into a
'civilized' state.") (quoting VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 9 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted); McCoy, supra note 93, at
447-48 ("The purpose of this policy was to assimilate Indian people and tribes into
American society, to dissolve the uniqueness of individual Indians and tribal communities,
and to 'rescue' Indians and tribes from their 'primitive' life-ways.").
97. Davidson, supra note 92, at 580.
98. Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe
Goes Whaling, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 165, 212 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Miller, Cultural
Self-Determination].
99. Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within
Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 55 (1998-1999) (noting that "Congress concluded that the allotment
system was a failure"); see also Guzman, supra note 78, at 605 ("Unless its covert purpose
was to force precipitous declines in Indian-held acreage, allotment failed."); James T.
Hamilton, Progressing Back: A Tribal Solution for a Federal Morass, 27 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 375, 377 n.7 (2002-2003) ("Allotment was a tremendous 'success,' at least insofar as it
was intended to be a massive land grab.").
100. John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Values in Transition: The Chiricahua Apache from 1886-
1914, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 39, 79 (2010-2011) ("Allotment resulted in a dramatic loss in
tribal land holdings .... It also meant impoverishment for most of the Indian individuals
(who often got the worst of the allotments), inadequate capital to make new beginnings, little
instruction, limited access to markets, and a weakened tribe and social service network to
buffer them.").
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virtually decimating their land base.' 0 ' "With a declining and fragmented
land base and scores of displaced families, the fabric and strength of tribal
government withered."'1
02
Recognizing the damage that allotment was inflicting upon tribal
communities, the federal government reversed its assimilationist policy in
1934 with the adoption of the Indian Reorganization Act,103 designed to
salvage whatever remnants of tribal sovereignty remained.104 The Act "was
intended to foster cohesive, land-based tribal communities . . . and to
encourage Indian tribes to revitalize their self-government."', 05 In an effort
to rebuild tribal communities, the Act "establish[ed] territorial tribal
governance by incorporating communities of Indians as tribes" and "created
new tribal polities based on the existing reservation system."lo6
But after only a short time, the federal government once again grew
weary of promoting tribal sovereignty, and a new policy era was ushered in:
termination. Similar in sentiment to the allotment era, the termination
policy went a step further, and was "designed to end the authority and legal
existence of tribal governments."lo7 Despite settled law holding that
Congress has plenary power over tribal matters and that tribes are to remain
free from state interference, os Congress "took [] steps to limit its
involvement in Indian affairs and to increase state powers over
reservations."1
09
101. Bethany Ruth Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934,
21 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 8 (1997) ("The effects were devastating - of 138,000,000 acres
Indians held when the Dawes Act was passed, only 48,000,000 were left in 1934, and nearly
half of these were desert or semidesert.").
102. Eric Lemont, Developing Effective Processes ofAmerican Indian Constitutional and
Governmental Reform: Lessons from the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Hualapai Nation,
Navajo Nation, and Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 147, 151 (2001-2002).
103. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-495 (2006)).
104. See Kristina L. McCulley, Comment, The American Indian Probatye Reform Act of
2004: The Death of Fractionation or Individual Native American Property Interests and
Tribal Customs?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 401, 409 (2005-2006) (noting that the Indian
Reorganization Act "encouraged the promotion of tribal self-government").
105. Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference
for Descent Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
234, 274 (2008-2009).
106. Id. at 275.
107. Miller, Cultural Self-Determination, supra note 98, at 213.
108. See supra Part III.A.I.




After several years of termination policy, the fickle'lo federal
government changed its tune, once again favoring tribal sovereignty over
assimilative efforts."Il This new era of self-determination began in the
1960s,112 but achieved "official" status in 1970 with President Nixon's
pronouncement that federal policy was "to shift from forced tribal
assimilation to tribal freedom to determine the appropriate paths for the
present and the future."ll 3  Self-determination meant "the ability of a
people to decide their political status and to direct their own social, cultural,
and economic development."ll 4  But despite that "every President since
1960" has supported the self-determination policy and that "Congress has
also passed numerous statutes empowering tribal governments, 115the
Court has not followed suit.116 In other words, not only has the federal
government completely reversed its policy stance toward tribes numerous
times, but the branches within the government appear fragmented with
regard to their commitment to the self-determination policy. For judges
unfamiliar with the storied history of Indian law, making sense of the
patchwork of policies and the shifting rules that accompany them is nearly
110. Aaron F.W. Meek, Comment, The Conflict Between State Tests of Tribal Entity
Immunity and the Congressional Policy of Indian Self-Determination, 35 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 141, 142 (2010-2011) (noting that "[t]hroughout United States history, Indian law has
been subject to the ebb and flow of a fickle Congress").
111. See Nathaniel T. Haskins, Note, Framing Concurrent Jurisdiction Issues in the Self-
Determination Era: Accepting the First Circuit's Analysis but Rejecting its Application to
Preserve Tribal Sovereignty, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 441, 444 (2007-2008).
112. Ann Richard, Note, Application of the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act to Indian Tribes: Thwarting the Economic Self-Determination of
Tribes, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 203, 219 (2005-2006).
113. Whitney Kerr, Giving Up the "I": How the National Museum of the American
Indian Appropriated Tribal Voices, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 421, 422 (2004-2005) (citing
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian
Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 (1970)); see also Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation
with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of
Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 21, 32 (2000) (noting that "President Nixon's 1970 message
to Congress on Indian affairs is the landmark beginning of the 'Self-Determination' era").
114. Joanna M. Wagner, Improving Native American Access to Federal Funding for
Economic Development through Partnerships with Rural Communities, 32 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 525, 527 (2007-2008).
115. Meek, supra note 110, at 142-43.
116. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sawnawgezewog: "The Indian Problem" and
the Lost Art of Survival, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 35, 67 (2003-2004) (reviewing and
summarizing the many Supreme Court cases that "take[] the concept of self-determination
that has been the paradigm of congressional Indian policy since 1970, pervert[] it, twist[] it,
and reverse[] it").
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hopeless, rendering the need to appoint Native American judges familiar
with this history and culture to the bench all the more important.
3. Jurisdiction
The rules surrounding jurisdiction over tribal members and their lands
are even more convoluted, multifarious, and riddled with nuance than the
complex, ever-shifting policy eras. Depending on a variety of factors,
tribal, state, or federal jurisdiction - or even some combination thereof -
may apply." 7 There are different jurisdictional rules depending on whether
the legal issue is criminal or civil.11 8 Within the criminal context, there are
different jurisdictional rules depending on the nature and severity of the
crime. 119 Within the civil context, there are different jurisdictional rules
depending on whether the nature of state involvement is adjudicatory or
regulatory.120 There are also different rules depending on the state in which
the prescribed conduct occurred,121 as well as depending on whether it
occurred within Indian Country or outside its boundaries.122 What qualifies
as Indian Country, however, is unsettled and provides a nucleus for many
disputes.123 Moreover, different jurisdictional rules apply depending on
whether each party appearing before the judge is considered a tribal
member, a nonmember Indian, or a non-Indian. 24 And to make matters
even more confusing, the questions of jurisdiction and choice of law are not
necessarily coterminous. It is possible that a given set of circumstances will
117. See Dale Beck Furnish, Sorting Out Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country After
Plains Commerce Bank: State Courts and the Judicial Sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, 33
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 385, 393 (2008-2009).
118. See Douglas B. Cubberley, Note, Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians:
The Legal VoidAfter Duro v. Reina, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 213, 235 (1991).
119. See Henry S. Noyes, A "Civil" Method of Law Enforcement on the Reservation: In
Rem Forfeiture and Indian Law, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 307, 307-08 (1995-1996).
120. See Sandra Hansen, Survey of Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country 1990, 16 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 319, 338-39 (1991).
121. William V. Vetter, A New Corridor for the Maze: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction and
Nonmember Indians, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 349, 350 (1992) (noting that Public Law 280
transferred limited jurisdiction over tribal matters to certain states).
122. Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development on Indian Reservations:
Overview of Tribal, State, and Federal Jurisdiction, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 71, 87 (1992).
123. See, e.g., Jennifer Nutt Carleton, State Income Taxation of Nonmember Indians in
Indian Country, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 253, 255 (2002-2003).
124. See, e.g., Grant Christensen, Creating Bright-Line Rules for Tribal Court
Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: The Case of Trespass to Real Property, 35 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 527, 560 (2010-2011).
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mandate the application of tribal law in state courts, for example.1 As a
result, those judges deciding tribal interests without an understanding of the
many factors that go into determining whether the court even has
jurisdiction to make such decisions are wont to hand down ill-informed
rulings.
4. Land "Ownership"
The rules governing land held by Native Americans are unique and
complex in comparison to other property law in the United States. The
divergence of Native American property law orilinates in Chief Justice
Marshall's characterization of tribal landholding. 26 Today, complicated
legal rules continue to govern jurisdiction over tribal members and their
lands, the way in which tribes hold their lands, and the uses to which those
lands can be put. The closest non-Indian law parallel to Indian landholding
is landlord-tenant law, with the federal government acting as landlord and
the tribes as tenants.127 A tribe's right of occupancy is similar to a tenant's
right to occupy a leased property, and like the landlord, the federal
government holds the underlying fee title to the subject lands.
But there are some important differences between a traditional landlord-
tenant relationship and that of the federal government to tribes. First, the
federal government owes a fiduciary obligation to the tribes and their
members,128 something that does not hold true in a traditional landlord-
125. See Jackie Gardina, Federal Preemption: A Roadmap for the Application of Tribal
Law in State Courts, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 23 (2010-2011) (noting that "[a]fter the state
court determines that it has legislative jurisdiction, a separate question arises regarding what
law applies in a civil dispute between private parties").
126. Recall that Marshall characterized the nature of tribes' landholding as a right of
occupancy, with the federal government retaining the underlying fee title to the subject
lands. In other words, the tribes hold possessory rights to the lands. David J. Bloch,
Colonizing the Last Frontier, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 10 (2004-2005).
127. David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M'Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v.
United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 159, 164 (1994) ("The federal government, as the
ultimate landlord, not only possesse[s] the power to terminate the 'tenancy' of its occupants
but also could materially affect the lives of Indians through its control and regulation of land
use.") (quoting DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 96, at 26-27) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128. See, e.g., R. Spencer Clift, III, The Historical Development of American Indian
Tribes; Their Recent Dramatic Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the
Eligibility ofIndian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 177, 210 (2002-2003) (articulating "the fiduciary relationship owed Indian tribes as
the highest of moral obligations appropriately judged by the most 'exacting fiduciary
standards"') (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
No. 2] 477
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
tenant relationship. Second, while in a traditional tenancy, an unhappy
tenant can terminate her lease and bring herself under the management of a
new landlord in the building next door, tribal members wishing to remain
on Indian lands cannot escape the control of the federal government. 129
Third, tenants' possessory rights are typically contractual, with no inherent
right to remain indefinitely, 130 while tribal members' occupancy rights are
not contractual and carry the right to remain until such time as the federal
government "exercises its power of eminent domain," taking the Indians'
lands under the Fifth Amendment's authority.131 And more differences
exist still. Accordingly, a judge who attempts to distill tribal landholding
into nothing more than a landlord-tenant relationship would miss many of
the nuances that accompany Indian title and could thereby leave important
rights unvindicated.
Because of the unique way in which tribes hold land, the rights
associated with such landholding are unique and torturously complex. The
nature of land ownership affects everything from the states' rights (or lack
thereof) to levy taxes on tribal lands and tribal members,132 to the tribes'
abilities to acquire private loans. Moreover, tribes and their members are
governed by separate federal legislation for a variety of everyday matters
129. See Eileen M. Luna, The Impact of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 on
Tribal Governments, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 445, 473 (1998) (noting that through its plenary
power, the federal government asserts "ultimate authority over Indian peoples and lands").
130. Paul Sullivan, Note, Security of Tenure for the Residential Tenant: An Analysis and
Recommendations, 21 VT. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (1997) ("The lease is a contractual instrument
which conveys property, an 'estate,' for a period of time, a 'term,' which signifies not only
the limitation of time, but the estate and interest that pass for such time.").
131. Mark Ulmer, Tribal Property: Defining the Parameters of the Federal Trust
Relationship Under the Non-Intercourse Act: Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 12
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 101, 108 n.32 (1985).
132. David B. Wiles, Taxation: Tribal Taxation, Secretarial Approval, and State
Taxation - Merrion and Beyond, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 167, 178 (1983) ("It has long been
recognized that states have no power to tax Indian trust lands, nontrust property owned by a
tribal member on tribal land, and income earned by a tribal member on tribal land.").
133. Crystal D. Masterson, Comment, Wind-Energy Ventures in Indian Country:
Fashioning a Functional Paradigm, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 317, 353 n.275 (2009-2010)
("On account of the nature of ownership in Indian Country, tribes confront unique barriers in
acquiring private loans. The federal government owns fee title to all Indian lands held in
trust, with the Indians retaining a right of occupancy. Because lenders are invariably wary
of granting unsecured loans, tribes and their members may confront difficulty in acquiring
private loans since homes and other buildings on trust land cannot serve as reliable
collateral.. . . [T]o secure private loans, tribes and their members must therefore possess




on account of the nature of tribal landholding.134 While a full discussion of
tribal land rights is outside the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that
judges cannot make informed, well-reasoned decisions without appreciating
the many earmarks of tribal landholding and its concomitant rights.
B. The Prejudices of the Certiorari Process
As the previous section detailed, the tribes' unique status within the
governmental structure means that the federal government, as guardian to
the tribes, must act in the tribes' best interests pursuant to the fiduciary duty
it owes them.135 The term fiduciary comes from the Latin word fiducia,
which "carries connotations of total trust, good faith, and honesty." 136 A
fiduciary is "charged by law and equity with a higher duty [of] care" and is
"required by law to place [its beneficiary's interests] ahead of [its] own in
all dealings . . . ."137 But despite these most exacting legal obligations, the
federal government, through the certiorari process, effectively disfavors
tribal interests.
Professor Matthew Fletcher published an extensive study of the certiorari
process surrounding tribal-interest petitions. His study reached some
startling conclusions regarding the inherent barriers to Supreme Court
review of tribal-interest cases, finding that the Supreme Court's certiorari
process "creates an affirmative barrier to justice for parties like Indian
tribes and individual Indians" by rejecting certiorari for nearly all petitions
filed in favor of tribal interests. 3 8 Moreover, if the Supreme Court decides
to accept a petition regarding tribal interests, there is a 75% chance that the
tribal interest will lose.139 During the period between 1986 and 1993,
ninety-two tribal-interest petitions were considered for certiorari, with the
134. See, e.g., McCulley, supra note 104, at 412-15 (overviewing the American Indian
Probate Reform Act, which governs the intestate distribution of trust property); Aaron Drue
Johnson, Just Say No (to American Capitalism): Why American Indians Should Reject the
Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act and Other Attempts to Promote Economic
Assimilation, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 107, 113-15, 120-23 (2010-2011) (examining and
critiquing the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act, which is intended to govern secured
transactions in the tribal setting, replacing the Uniform Commercial Code).
135. See, e.g., Todd Miller, Easements on Tribal Sovereignty, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
105, 125 (2001-2002) ("When the Department of Interior is applying these regulations, they
must do so in the tribes' best interest, in order to fulfill their fiduciary duty to the tribes.").
136. CHRISTIAN D. RAHAIM, THE FIDUCIARY: AN IN-DEPTH GUIDE TO FIDUCIARY
DUTIES - FROM STUDEBAKER TO ENRON 5 (2005).
137. Id.
138. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless, supra note 7, at 933.
139. Id. at 935.
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Supreme Court granting only one of those petitions.140 During the same
period, states and local governments, countering the positions of tribal
interests, filed only thirty-seven certiorari petitions.141 And yet, the Court
granted fourteen of those petitions.142 Native Americans are pleading with
the Court for legal review of tribal issues far more often than states - and
are being rejected far more often as well. 143
Professor Fletcher asserts that this disparity in the certiorari process is
not caused by "mere agenda-setting" on the part of the Supreme Court.144
Rather, he maintains "that the certiorari process itself creates conditions
that lead the Supreme Court to accept cases that are likely to be decided
against tribal interests."1 45 Much of the problem stems from the value that
the Supreme Court places on resolving jurisdictional splitsl46 and unsettled
law.147 Tribal-interest cases fail to meet either of these criteria most of the
time.14 8
But what happens if tribes, their members, or their supporters are able to
get a case in front of the Supreme Court? Fletcher's study suggests that,
over the last few decades, even if tribal parties appear before the Supreme





144. Id. at 937.
145. Id.
146. Id. Indian law cases have "limited territorial reach" making "splits in lower court
authority [I unlikely." Id. "Circuit splits tend not to arise in Indian law cases because often
the only possible split is between a state court and a federal circuit." Id. at 957. Moreover,
it is "often the case that a fact pattern will be unique to a particular tribe or reservation,
rendering the possibility of a split very unlikely." Id. at 961. This inherent barrier allows a
certiorari-pool memo writer to discount a case with a great deal of "practical significance"
simply because "the questions are not of general legal significance." Id. (quoting Cert Pool
Memo at 13, Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) (No. 88-
1785), Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) (No. 88-1915),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/BlackmunMemos/1989/DM-1989-
pdf/88-1915.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. at 937. Tribal-interest cases are often "complex," involving "factbound
applications of settled law." Id. When cases are "factbound," the memo writer will deny the
certiorari petition so long as "the lower court correctly state[d] ... the applicable rule." Id.
at 964. Compounding the already prohibitive barriers to granting certiorari for tribal-interest
petitions, "the cert pool members assume tribal interests are not important to their audience,"
and thus draft memoranda denying petitions in favor of tribal interests. Id. at 938.




2006, the Supreme Court decided forty-eight Indian law cases, with tribal
interests winning only eleven times. 14 While these figures are troubling,
there is hope to reverse these trends, and that hope lies in nominating
Native American judges to the federal bench.
IV. Arvo Mikkanen's Failed Nomination: What Might Have Been
A. The Failed Nomination of a Qualified Native American to the Federal
Judiciary
In February 2011, President Barack Obama nominated Arvo Mikkanen
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.15 0
Former Oklahoma governor, Brad Henry, supported the President in this
nomination. 15 1  President Obama's nomination and Governor Henry's
approval were well deserved. Mikkanen graduated magna cum laude from
Dartmouth College, received his Juris Doctor from Yale Law School,
clerked for two federal judges, currently serves as an Assistant United
States Attorney, and is the current president of the Oklahoma Indian Bar
Association. He also received a unanimous rating of "qualified" from
the American Bar Association in consideration for his nomination to be a
federal district judge.153
Mikkanen has strong ties to Oklahoma, serving as an Oklahoma lawyer
for twenty-five years. Mikkanen's former U.S. Attorney supervisor, Dan
Webber, said that Mikkanen "has been recognized by the Oklahoma Bar
Association for his pro bono service and by the FBI for his prosecutorial
skills."155 Further, as "an expert on federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian
149. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless, supra note 7, at 943.
150. Chris Casteel, Senators Block Oklahoma City Federal Prosecutor from Judge Post,
NEWsOK, Dec. 18, 2011, http://newsok.com/article/3633139.
151. Jim Myers, Nominee for Judgeship Listed Henry as Backer, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 19,
2011, http://www.tulsaworld.com/site/printerfriendlystory.aspx?articleid=20110219_16_Al
U LNSbr526639&PrintComments=l.
152. Andrew Cohen, Judicial Nominee Arvo Mikkanen Deserves Answers, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 21, 2011, 9:14 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/02/judicial-
nominee-arvo-mikkanen-deserves-answers/71425/ [hereinafter Cohen, Judicial Nominee]
(this "letter" was not written by Arvo Mikkanen).
153. Casteel, supra note 150.
154. Jim Myers, Questions Surround Judicial Nomination of Arvo Mikkanen for Tulsa,
'TLSA WORLD (Feb. 6, 2011, 2:30 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?sub
jectid=l 1&articleid=20110206_16_A23_CUTLIN390175 [hereinafter Myers, Questions].
155. Id.
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Country,"l 56 Mikkanen helped launch the "use of child psychologists and
specially trained pediatricians in the process of interviewing preteen victims
of sexual abuse."
Despite Mikkanen's strong credentials and deep ties to Oklahoma, his
nomination faced immediate opposition from Oklahoma senators Tom
Coburn and James Inhofe. Senator CoburnlS9 said that Mikkanen was
"unacceptable" for the position,160 offering as explanation nothing more
than an alleged breach of protocol,161 which itself was no fault of
Mikkanen's. The alleged breach of protocol concerned the executive
branch's failure to consult the Oklahoma Senators prior to announcing the
nominations.162 By mid-December 2011, the Oklahoma Senators were
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Cohen, Judicial Nominee, supra note 152.
159. Interestingly, Senator Coburn not only sits on the Senate Judiciary Committee, but
is also a member of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee. Press Release, Senator Tom
Coburn, Legislation & Issues: Native Americans (Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://www.
coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfn/?p=NativeAmericans. As a member of the Indian
Affairs Committee, he vowed to have "regular meetings with tribal leaders and
representatives to discuss the important issues facing tribes." Id. And yet, despite his
disagreement with this nomination, it has not been established that Coburn held a meeting
with tribal leaders to discuss the implications of the nomination.
160. Cohen, Judicial Nominee, supra note 152.
161. Press Release, Senator Tom Cobum, Dr. Coburn's Statement on the Nomination of
Arvo Mikkanen to U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (Feb. 2, 2011),
available at http://www.cobum.senate.gov/public/index.cfi/pressreleases?ContentRecord
id=b ll8e67 1 -fce6-4767-aa0e-dcb5811 be6d6 (stating that he was "disappointed in the White
House's lack of consultation with [him] on this nomination").
162. Myers, Questions, supra note 154. It is customary for the home state's senators to
prescribe judicial nominations. These members even retain influence over the confirmation
process itself. As a courtesy, home state senators are generally consulted prior to a formal
announcement of a nomination and, in this case, it is unclear whether this courtesy occurred.
Id. The nomination process begins with the announcement of a vacant seat in the federal
judiciary. The President typically consults home state senators before formally announcing
a nomination. Before the Senate confirms the nomination, the Senate Judiciary Committee
collects information and holds hearings. During committee hearings witnesses may testify
regarding nominees and the Committee members question the nominees. The Committee
then votes in order to send the nomination to the full Senate for a confirmation vote. See
Federal Judicial Nomination Process, LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.civilrights.org/judiciary/courts/nominations.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
Although the Constitution prescribes no requirements for the selection of federal judges, the
primary factors that determine who will sit on the federal bench consist of "politics and




successful in completely blocking Mikkanen's nomination for a federal
judgeship in the Northern District.163 Absent a formal record, it is
impossible to determine precisely why Mikkanen's nomination was
considered "unacceptable."1 64
While rejecting without explanation a qualified Native American judicial
nominee at a time when Native interests are suffering is troubling in itself,
that the rejection came in Oklahoma is all the more troubling. Oklahoma
boasts the second largest Native American population in the country. 6 5
Moreover, Mikkanen is a Kiowa Tribe member,166 meaning that he would
have been "only the third recorded Native American federal judge in U.S.
history." 67
include "ideological compatibility with the views of the President, political party,
representational factors such as race and gender, and professional qualifications").
163. Casteel, supra note 150. Mikkanen's nomination, along with that of seven other
judicial nominees, was never considered by the Committee members and was sent back to
the White House on December 17, 2011. The Senate finalized its work for the year without
a Committee hearing or any other type of debate on the return of Mikkanen's nomination.
Id.
164. While an explanation certainly is elusive, speculation is nonetheless possible. The
rejection of Mikkanen's nomination could simply be a product of divided government,
where Mikkanen's fate was the same as the democratic President's other seven nominees,
whose nominations were reflexively blocked by Republicans. In fact, the chance of a
successful confirmation of the President's judicial nominees is markedly reduced when the
home state's senators and the President do not share the same political party. Another
possible reason for the outright block of Mikkanen's nomination could be the breach of
courtesy between the two governmental branches, with the President failing to uphold the
traditional protocol of consulting the state's senators on judicial nominations. Id.
165. Cohen, Mikkanen Nomination, supra note 72. The overall Native American
population in the United States is 1%, but in Oklahoma, the Native American population is
about 8%. Id.
166. See Casteel, supra note 150.
167. Andrew Cohen, 3 Questions for Justice Alito About Native American Concerns,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/08/
3-questions-for-justice-alito-about-native-american-concerns/243895/ (emphasis added).
The two Native Americans who have served on the federal judiciary are Billy Michael
Burrage and Frank Howell Seay. Cohen, Mikkanen Nomination, supra note 72. Burrage, a
member of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, served as a federal judge for all three United
States District Courts in Oklahoma. History of the Federal Judiciary: Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=
328&cid=999&ctype=na&inst ate=na (last visited May 14, 2012). Seay, a federal judge for
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, "didn't even know
about his native heritage until he was in his 50s" and already on the bench. Cohen,
Mikkanen Nomination, supra note 72.
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B. What Could Have Been
The startlingly low number of Native American judges throughout
American history matters for all of the reasons discussed so far in this
comment. First, it affects the public's perception of the judicial branch.
Democracy flourishes when citizens trust the government and remain
involved in its affairs. But in the American democratic system, citizens
cannot cast votes for federal judges. Instead, members of the executive and
legislative branches appoint these judges. When the public lacks a direct
say in who will be the ultimate arbiters of their affairs, the onus on the
government to appoint a diverse bench becomes critically important.
Because public confidence increases when the federal bench reflects a cross
section of society,168 greater judicial diversity breeds a public more likely
to accept that the judicial system is also a democratic system.
Had Arvo Mikkanen been confirmed as a federal judge, research
suggests that it would have increased "both public support of the courts and
perceptions of fairness."1 69 The effects of such a judicial appointment in
Oklahoma would have been even more pronounced because of its notably
high Native American population. With 8% of Oklahoma's population
self-identifying as Native American,170 the presence of a Native American
judge in the Oklahoma courts is necessary for its judiciary to reflect a cross
section of society - the key ingredient to engendering public confidence in
the judiciary.
In addition to its impact on public confidence, the lack of Native
Americans on the federal bench affects substantive decision making by
impeding empathy. In Part II, this comment examined various studies on
judicial empathy, the collective results of which established a meaningful
correlation between minority status and judicial decision making. Judicial
empathy impacts not only the minority judge, but fellow judges as well.
Bringing an empathetic, human perspective to the courtroom both impacts
and enhances substantive decision making. For example, the studies
indicate that the presence of female judges affects the outcomes of gender-
based cases, that the presence of African American judges affects the
outcomes of race-based cases, and that one's own minority status has a
subconscious effect on the judicial decision-making process.1 7' A logical
extension of these principles would presume that the presence of a Native
American judge, such as Arvo Mikkanen, would affect the outcomes of
168. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 14, at 13.
169. Graham, supra note 10, at 156.
170. Cohen, Mikkanen Nomination, supra note 72.




tribal-interest cases. And with Oklahoma's sizeable Indian population,
tribal-interest cases are likely to arise in Oklahoma courts with relative
frequency, making the presence of an empathetic judge all the more critical.
Intimately related to judicial empathy, the lack of Native Americans on
the bench places Native American plaintiffs before judges who are often
poorly versed in the intricate and nuanced field of Indian law.' 7 2 Judges
frequently do not appreciate the nature of the unique relationship between
the federal government and the tribes.173  They are also unlikely to
appreciate the historically shifting patterns of federal Indian policy, which
make many of the laws governing tribes and their members era-
dependent. 174 They are unlikely to appreciate the manifold rules governing
jurisdiction, which mandate that different government bodies deal with
different matters, depending on countless factors relating to the nature of
the dispute, as well as the tribal member, nonmember, or non-Indian status
of each party.175  They are unlikely to appreciate the nature of tribal
landholding, which is unlike any other form of landholding with which they
may be familiar.176
Not only are the laws governing Native Americans markedly different
from the laws governing the rest of society, but the ultimate goal of the pro-
tribal movement departs from all other minority-based movements with
respect to its ultimate goal, making its understanding by outsiders all the
more elusive. While traditional pro-minority movements advocate for
equality in the form of civil rights, pro-tribal movements instead advocate
for the right to remain different through the exercise of sovereign rights.' 7 7
As Professor David Getches aptly notes, "open-minded judge[s], conscious
of latent prejudices," may be able to sympathize "with a person
disadvantaged by society's exclusion or disenfranchisement, but a new
172. While there is no guarantee that a Native American judge would possess more
knowledge in the area of Indian law than a non-Indian judge, it is nevertheless more likely
that the Native American judge would be more familiar with federal Indian law and tribal
culture than his non-Indian counterpart. See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental
Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REv. 649, 663 (2006)
(discussing Professor Krakoffs article regarding the virtual impossibility of explaining the
"cultural quality of sovereignty . .. to non-Indians.").
173. See supra Part III.A.1.
174. See supra Part III.A.2.
175. See supra Part III.A.3.
176. Although tribal landholding shares some similarities with leasing, there are also
countless differences. See supra Part III.A.4.
177. See BEYOND RED POWER: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND ACTIVISM SINCE 1900, at
35 (Daniel M. Cobb & Loretta Fowler eds., 2007).
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dimension is added when the 'different' claimant or class asserts the right to
remain different."1 78  As a result of the different motivations behind
traditional pro-minority movements and the pro-tribal movement, Professor
Getches asserts that "a panel of elite, predominately white male lawyers"
may find it easier "to understand the problem of employment discrimination
against an African-American single mother whose goal is to come closer to
the mainstream than . . . to appreciate the importance of cultural survival
that depends on tribal traditions and autonomy that would allow killing
eagles for ceremonial purposes." 79  In other words, there is a lack of
familiarity with tribal interests compared with other minority interests,
impeding the potential for judicial empathy to an even greater degree.
While the absence of Native Americans on the bench has symbolic and
substantive effects through its impact on public perception and empathetic,
informed decision making, it also has practical effects. The lack of Native
American presence in the judiciary may exacerbate the barriers to tribal-
interest petitions reaching the Supreme Court because tribes lack an internal
voice to counter memo writers' assumptions that "tribal interests are not
important to their audience." Professor Fletcher's study found that
tribal-interest certiorari petitions are disproportionately rejected.181
Moreover, when tribal-interest issues do make it before the Supreme Court,
the Court finds against tribal interests in the vast majority of cases.182 Arvo
Mikkanen might have been able to alter this trend. As a proven advocate of
Native interests,183 he could have brought greater awareness to Professor
Fletcher's findings. He could have demonstrated that tribal interests are
American interests. He could have shown that Indian law is anything but
settled, bringing tribal-interest petitions within the class likely to be granted
certiorari.18
And what if Arvo Mikkanen or another Native American eventually
found himself on the Supreme Court? As studies indicate, the presence of a
minority judge on a panel not only affects the substantive decision making
of the individual minority judge, but similarly affects the substantive
decision making of all the judges who sit with him on the given panel. 85
178. Getches, supra note 1, at 305.
179. Id.
180. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless, supra note 7, at 938.
181. Id. at 933.
182. Id. at 935.
183. Myers, Questions, supra note 154.
184. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.




From this, one could draw the logical conclusion that Native American
representation on the Supreme Court would lead to more favorable
outcomes for tribal parties. Federal Indian policy could become more
settled.186 Laws governing relations with Indians and tribes could become
less ambiguous, more universally familiar, and more widely understood.
V. Conclusion
Nominating a Native American to the federal bench would have
implications far beyond its symbolic social value. Not only would Native
American presence on the judicial panel influence societal perceptions of
justice and fairness, but it would also enhance substantive decision making,
leading to empathetic holdings that respect tribal interests. Native
American judges would bring unique tribal perspectives to the bench,
elevating the panel's understanding of the convoluted field of Indian law,
with its rich but serpentine history. Moreover, they would bring hope to
tribal parties endeavoring to bring their disputes before the Supreme Court.
Arvo Mikkanen's nomination could have reinvigorated a Native
American population suffocating under the weight of repeated rejections
and defeats in federal courts. If the next Native American nominee is
confirmed, this comment asserts that his or her presence on the federal
judiciary will increase public confidence in the justice system, will enhance
substantive decision making in tribal-interest cases, and will place tribal
litigants in front of empathetic judges who are familiar with and respectful
of their unique circumstance.
186. See supra Part III.A.2 (overviewing the waves of federal policy regarding Indians
throughout American history).
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